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Explaining participation in the informal economy: a purchaser perspective 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose 
Participation in the informal economy has been predominantly explained from a supply-side 
perspective by evaluating the rationales for people working in this sphere. Recognising that 
many transactions in the informal economy are often instigated by customers, exemplified by 
SXUFKDVHUV DVNLQJ ³KRZ PXFK IRU FDVK"´ WKH DLP RI WKLV SDSHU LV WR H[SODLQ WKH LQIRUPDO
economy from a demand-side perspective by evaluating ciWL]HQV¶ UDWLRQDOHV IRU PDNLQJ
purchases in the informal economy. Here, we test three potential explanations for acquiring 
goods and services in the informal economy, grounded in rational economic actor, social 
actor and formal economy imperfections theoretical perspectives.    
 
Methodology 
To do this, a 2013 Eurobarometer survey, involving 27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted 
in 28 European Union member states is reported. 
 
Findings 
The finding is that all three rationales apply but the weight given to each varies across 
populations. A multinomial logit regression analysis then pinpoints the specific groups 
variously using the informal economy to obtain a lower price, for social or redistributive 
rationales, or due to the failures of the formal economy in terms of the availability, speed and 
quality of provision.  
 
Practical Implications 
The outcome is to reveal that the policy approach of changing the cost/benefit ratios 
confronting purchasers will only be effective for those purchasers citing a lower price as their 
prime rationale. Different policy measures will be required for those making informal 
economy purchases due to the shortcomings of the formal economy, and for social ends. 
These policy measures are then discussed. 
  
Originality/value 
The value and originality of this paper is that it explains participation in the informal 
economy from a purchaser, rather than the predominant supplier, perspective.  
 
Keywords: informal sector; shadow economy; undeclared work; consumption; public policy; 
European Union. 
 
Introduction 
 
Until now, participation in the informal economy has been almost exclusively explained from 
a supply-side perspective that evaluates the motives for people working in this sphere 
(Maloney, 2004, Ponsaers et al., 2008; Rodgers et al., 2008; Williams, 2015a,b). The 
outcome has been a heated structure versus agency debate about whether informal workers do 
so out of necessity or as a matter of choice (Gerxhani, 2004; Perry and Maloney, 2007; 
Williams, 2014; Williams and Youseff, 2015). Until now, however, few studies have 
analysed the other side of the coin and adopted a demand-side perspective when seeking to 
explain participation in the informal economy (for exceptions, see Williams and Martinez-
Perez, 2014a,b). To do so, however, is important. The informal economy results not only 
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from people being willing to supply such work. It is also the result of the demand from 
purchasers for goods and services produced in the informal economy. The aim in this paper, 
therefore, is to evaluate purchasers¶PRWLYHVIRUacquiring goods and services in the informal 
economy. 
 In the next section, therefore, competing ways in which one might explain the 
purchase of goods and services in the informal economy are reviewed. Purchasers of goods 
and services in the informal economy might be viewed firstly, as rational economic actors 
seeking a lower price, secondly, as social actors engaging in such exchanges for social or 
redistributive reasons and third and finally, as engaging in such transactions because of the 
failures of the formal economy to deliver goods and services. To evaluate these rival potential 
theoretical explanations, and which populations obtain goods and services in the informal 
economy for each reason, the third section introduces the data set, namely a survey involving 
27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted across the 28 members states of the European 
Union (EU-28), along with the multinomial logit model used to analyse the data. The fourth 
section then reveals the commonality of each of these explanations among purchasers across 
the EU-28, and which populations are most likely to state which motives. The fifth and final 
section then explores how this new demand-side approach advances theorisations of the 
informal economy and investigates the policy implications for how the informal economy is 
tackled. 
Before commencing, however, the informal economy must be defined. In this paper, 
we follow the strong consensus among both academics and policy-makers that the informal 
economy involves monetary exchanges which are unregistered by or hidden from the state, 
for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes but are legal in all other respects 
(European Commission, 1998, 2007, OECD, 2002, Williams, 2004, Sepulveda and Syrett, 
2007). If exchanges are not legal in every other respect, they are not part of the informal 
economy. For example, if the goods and/or services purchased are illegal (e.g., illegal drugs), 
then such exchanges are not included in the informal economy but rather, are part of the 
wider criminal economy. Of course, it could be asserted that when engaging in exchanges, 
purchasers will not know whether suppliers declare the income for tax, social security and/or 
labour law purposes, and therefore whether the purchase is in the informal economy. Here, 
however, this is not an issue. Many transactions in the informal economy are in practice 
instigated by the purchaser, exemplified by them asking ³how much for cash?´, and this 
paper examines only exchanges in which the consumer deliberately initiates, or knowingly 
perceives themselves as participating in, the purchase of goods and services in the informal 
economy.  
 
Theoretical explanations for participation in the informal economy  
 
Most studies of the informal economy, both in the European Union and beyond, have adopted 
a supply-side approach, focusing upon how to explain why people work in the informal 
economy and developing policies to reduce the supply of informal work (Aliyev, 2015; 
European Commission, 2007, OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014, 2015a,b). Little attention has so 
far been given to the demand-side. Indeed, the only notable exceptions report data collected a 
decade or so ago on who makes purchases in the informal economy (Williams, 2008, 
Williams and Martinez, 2014a,b). Little contemporary knowledge therefore exists on 
purchasers¶PRWLYHVIRUVRXUFLQJIURPWKHLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\To advance understanding, in 
consequence, and drawing upon these earlier studies, we highlight three contrasting 
explanations for purchasers acquiring goods and services in the informal economy.   
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Rational economic actor theory 
 
For the past four decades or so, and deriving from the seminal work of Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), the dominant view has been that those participating in the informal economy 
are rational economic actors who weigh up the rewards and risks of their actions and act in a 
non-compliant manner when the expected probability of detection and penalty is smaller than 
the profits to be gained. This utility maximising view of the individual pursuing monetary 
gain has been widely adopted by both scholars and policy-makers. Informal workers are 
widely p rtrayed as rational economic actors doing so for the purpose of financial gain 
(Castells and Portes, 1989, Davis, 2006, Gallin, 2001), and purchasers represented as 
sourcing from the informal economy to benefit from the cheaper prices which outweigh the 
potential costs involved (Bajada, 2002; Fortin et al., 1996).  
 The outcome of this depiction of those participating in the informal economy as 
rational economic actors is that policy has sought to tackle this sphere by changing the cost-
benefit ratio that suppliers and purchasers confront when making a decision on whether to 
engage in the informal economy. The way in which this has been largely achieved is by 
altering the perceived and/or actual costs of doing so. A deterrence approach has been 
employed by governments, which increases the actual and/or perceived costs and risks of 
participating in the informal economy. This is achieved by increasing firstly, the perceived 
and/or actual risks of detection and secondly, the sanctions for those caught (Grabiner, 2000, 
Hasseldine and Li, 1999, Richardson and Sawyer, 2001, Sandford, 1999).  
 Recent years, however, have witnessed the emergence of alternative ways of 
explaining participation in the informal economy that have begun to question whether 
participants in the informal economy are always rational economic actors. Purchasers, for 
example, are no longer assumed to be driven to make acquisitions in the informal economy 
purely by the lower costs and the potential for financial gain.  
 
Social actor theory 
 
In stark contrast to the representation of participants in the informal economy as rational 
economic actors who respond to the cost/benefit ratios that they confront, recent years have 
witnessed the emergence of a social actor explanation for participation in the informal 
economy. This derives its inspiration from what is variously termed a critical, post-
structuralist, post-capitalist or post-development corpus of thought which has evaluated 
critically the dominant µthin¶ reading of monetary exchanges as always profit-driven market-
oriented transactions. Rather, Dµthicker¶ portrayal of monetary exchange has been developed 
which recognises that monetary exchanges are embedded in multifarious logics, including 
social logics (Bourdieu, 2001, Escobar, 1995, Gibson-Graham, 2006, Granovetter, 1985; 
Leyshon et al., 2003; Polanyi, 1944).  
  The outcome has been the emergence of a social actor theorisation of participation in 
the informal economy. Scholars have started to bring attention to how informal work is often 
undertaken by and for close social relations, such as kin, friends, neighbours and 
acquaintances, for social ends rather than purely for market-driven profit-oriented rationales 
(Nelson and Smith, 1999, White and Williams, 2010). Purchasers of goods and services from 
the informal economy can thus be represented as social actors rather than rational economic 
actors. For example, it has been highlighted how such purchasers from the informal economy 
are often sourcing goods and services from closer social relations, and are paying them for a 
good or to undertake a task (e.g., a small maintenance job such as gardening or home 
decoration) so as to give them much needed money (e.g., when the supplier is having 
financial difficulties), and in recompensing them for the task, they are avoiding the potential 
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perception that charity is involved on their part, which might well prevent the recipient from 
accepting money from them (Kempson 1996). These purchases of goods and services from 
close social relations in the informal economy are therefore embedded more in social 
relations akin to mutual aid than profit-oriented market-like transactions (Williams, 2004). 
Indeed, and as Zelizer (2005) has shown, the use of money in exchange relations does not 
always mean that an exchange is market-like and profit-motivated. The outcome of this social 
actor representation of participation in the informal economy, in consequence, has been to 
challenge the representation of purchasers from the informal economy as rational economic 
actors seeking lower costs and monetary gain. 
 
Formal economy imperfections theory 
 
A third theory that can be used to explain why citizens make purchases in the informal 
economy derives from institutional theory. Every society has laws and regulations (i.e. formal 
institutions) that set out the legal rules of the game (North 1990, Denzau and North 1994, 
Baumol and Blinder, 2008, Mathias et al., 2014, Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b,c). Every 
society, nevertheless, also has informal institutions, which prescribe WKH µVRFLDOO\ VKDUHG
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially 
VDQFWLRQHG FKDQQHOV¶ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727). Even if formal institutions deem 
participation in the informal economy by definition illegal because such activity does not 
adhere to the legal rules of the game, in many societies as a result of formal sector 
imperfections, participation in the informal economy is often viewed as a socially legitimate 
activity (De Soto, 1989, Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b).  
  Viewed through the lens of institutional theory, in consequence, participation in the 
informal economy can be explained as resulting from the existence of formal imperfections. 
On the supply-side, informal workers can be thus viewed as deciding not to join or exiting the 
formal economy because of the problems they witness, such as registering a business, high 
taxes, the demanding of bribes by corrupt state officials and the burden of regulations (De 
Soto, 1989, Maloney, 2004, Small Business Council, 2004, Cross and Morales, 2007). On the 
demand-side, similarly, purchasers can be seen as acquiring goods and services in the 
informal economy because of the failures of the formal economy. These failures or 
imperfections relate firstly, to the lack of availability and reliability of formal economy 
businesses (e.g., formal businesses may not be available to do various tasks or simply fail to 
turn up), secondly, to the speed of provision and third and finally, to the quality of the goods 
and services provided. As De Soto (1989: 255) thus states, µWKHUHDOSUREOHPLVQRWVRPXFK
LQIRUPDOLW\DVIRUPDOLW\¶, that is, the availability, speed and quality of provision in the formal 
economy. Unless these are solved, purchasers will thus continue to obtain goods and services 
in the informal economy.  
 Given these competing theoretical explanations for purchasing in the informal 
economy, attention now turns to evaluating their validity in order that purchasers¶PRWLYHVIRU
acquiring goods and services in the informal economy in the contemporary period in the EU-
28 can be understood.  
 
Methodology: examining motives for purchasing in the informal economy 
 
To evaluate the motives for making purchases in the informal economy, special 
Eurobarometer survey no. 402 conducted in 2013 is reported. This involved 27,563 face-to-
face interviews undertaken across the EU-28 with adults aged 15 years and older in the 
national language, with the number of interviews varying from 500 in smaller countries to 
1,500 in larger nations. Based on a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology, 
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this ensured that on the issues of age, gender, region and locality size, each country as well as 
each level of sample was representative in proportion to its population size. For the univariate 
analysis, nevertheless, we used sample weighting, as recommended in the broader literature 
(Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994) as well as the Eurobarometer methodology, 
in order to obtain meaningful descriptive results. For the multivariate analysis in contrast, 
there is debate over whether a weighting scheme should be used (Pfefferman, 1993; Solon et 
al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994). Reflecting the dominant viewpoint, the weighting 
scheme was not used. 
 Given that this is a sensitive topic, the face-to-face interviews firstly asked 
participants questions about their attitudes towards participating in the informal economy and 
having established some rapport, then moved onto questions regarding their purchase of 
goods and services in the informal economy in the last 12 months along with their reasons for 
doing so and finally, questions regarding their supply of informal work. Here, we focus upon 
their responses as purchasers. 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHILUVWDVNHGµ+DYH\RXLQWKHODVWPRQWKV
paid for any goods or services of which you had a good reason to assume that they included 
undeclared work (e.g. because there was no invoice or 9$7UHFHLSW"¶If so, they were then 
DVNHG µ:KDW PDGH \RX acquire it from a source involving undeclared income, instead of 
DFTXLULQJLWRQWKHRSHQPDUNHW"¶ORZHUSULFHIDVWHUVHUYLFHEHWWHUTXDOLW\LQRUGHUWRKHOS
someone who is in need of money; as a favour amongst friends/relatives/colleagues; good or 
service is not or hardly available on the regular market). 
To analyse the individual-level determinants of the motives for purchasing goods and 
services in the informal economy, a multinomial logit model with adjusted standard errors at 
the country level is here employed. Given that the question gathering the reasons for 
purchasing in the informal sector was asked only to those reporting a purchase over the last 
12 months, the result is a reduced sample size. In order to better estimate the model, those 
reporting not having purchased in the informal economy over the last year have been 
included as a reference category. Therefore, the obtained dependent variable used in analysis 
is a categorical variable coded as follows: value 1 for respondents reporting not having 
purchased goods and services in the informal economy, value 2 for those purchasing for 
lower price alone, 3 for social and/or redistributive reasons alone, 4 for poor formal provision 
alone, 5 for mixture of lower price & social and/or redistributive reasons, 6 for mixture of 
lower price and & poor formal provision, 7 for mixture of social and/or redistributive reasons 
& poor formal provision, 8 for mixture of lower price, social and/or redistributive reasons & 
poor formal provision, and 9 for other motives, refuse to answer or do not know. 
Meanwhile, the explanatory variables in the empirical analyses include: 
x Tax morality: constructed index of self-reported tolerance towards tax non-
compliance, where 1 represents higher tax morale and 10 lower tax morale. The 
UHOLDELOLW\&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDRIWKHLQGH[LV 
x Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for females and 1 for males. 
x Age: a continuous variable indicating the exact age of a respondent. 
x Marital status: a categorical variable for the marital status of the respondent with 
value 1 for married/ remarried individuals or living with partner, value 2 for singles, 
value 3 for those separated or divorced, and value 4 for widowed and for other form 
of marital status. 
x Occupation: a categorical variable grouping respondents by their occupation with 
value 1 for unemployed, value 2 for self-employed, value 3 for managers, value 4 for 
other white collars, value 5 for manual workers, value 6 for house persons, value 7 for 
retired individuals, and value 8 for students. 
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x Difficulties paying bills: a categorical variable for the respondent difficulties in paying 
bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of the time, value 2 for occasionally, 
and value 3 for almost never/ never. 
x People 15+ years in own household: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 
2 for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons, and value 4 for 4 persons or more. 
x Children: a dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in the 
household with value 0 for individuals with no children and value 1 for those having 
children. 
x Area: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with value 1 for 
rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for large 
town. 
x Region: a categorical variable for the region where the respondent lives with value 1 
for East-Central Europe, value 2 for Western Europe, value 3 for Southern Europe, 
and value 4 for Nordic Nations. 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the main results of the multivariate analysis, 
SUHGLFWHG SUREDELOLWLHV DUH XVHG WR FRQVWUXFW D µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶ FLWL]HQ which employs the 
mean and modal values across the EU287KLVµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶European citizen is thus a 47 
year old woman, retired, (re-) married/living with partner, with no children, lives in two 
person household in a small or middle town in Western Europe, who never or almost never 
confronts difficulties paying bills. %HORZWKLVµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶FLWL]HQZLOOEHXVHGWRDQDO\VH
and better specify the variations in motives driving purchasers into the informal economy 
across different tax morality levels.   
 Before reporting the results, nevertheless, their reliability needs to be briefly 
discussed, especially given the sensitive subject matter involved. The finding is that in 93 per 
cent of the interviews conducted, the interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation 
from the participant and in 6 per cent of the cases the cooperation was fair or average. 
Cooperation was asserted to be bad in only 1 per cent of cases and this poor cooperation was 
largely in relation to discussing their supply of work in the informal economy, not their 
purchase of goods and services in the informal economy. There are thus no reasons to doubt 
the reliability of this demand-side data. Given this, attention can turn to an analysis of the 
results. 
 
Results: explaining purchases from the informal economy 
 
Across the EU-28, 12 per cent of the survey participants (1 in 8) reported purchasing goods 
and services in the informal economy during the last 12 months prior to interview. Given the 
sensitive nature of the topic,  this should be treated as a lower-bound estimate. Nevertheless, 
such a finding closely aligns with wider estimates that the informal economy is the equivalent 
of some 12-15 per cent of GDP in western economies (Williams and Schneider, 2016). 
Turning to the types of goods and services purchased in the informal economy, some 4.1 per 
cent of the participants surveyed had acquired home maintenance and improvement services 
from the informal economy in the year prior to the survey, 3.3 per cent had sourced car repair 
services, 3.0 per cent other services (not otherwise listed here), 2.6 per cent had acquired food 
products, 2.6 per cent other products (not otherwise listed here), 1.9 per cent had obtained 
housecleaning services, 1.3 per cent health care services, 1.3 per cent gardening, 0.6 per cent 
tutoring services, 0.6 per cent babysitting services in their home, 0.5 per cent home removal 
help, 0.5 per cent assistance with IT problems, 0.4 per cent ironing services, 0.4 per cent care 
services for the elderly, and 0.2 per cent child care services outside of their home.  
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 Examining the propensity to purchase goods and services from the informal economy, 
nevertheless, the finding is that this is not evenly distributed across the EU-28. The 
proportion of participants making purchases in the informal economy was highest in the 
Nordic nations where 17 per cent had acquired goods and services informally in the past year, 
and was lowest is displayed in Western Europe where 11 per cent had purchased from the 
informal economy. 
 What, therefore, are their motives for making purchases from the informal economy? 
Is it the case that they are rational economic actors seeking to pay a lower price? Or are they 
social act rs making purchases for social or redistributive reasons? Or alternatively, is their 
participation in the informal economy a result of the failings of the formal economy in terms 
of the availability, speed and quality of provision? To answer these questions, Table 1 reports 
the descriptive statistics regarding purchasers¶ PRWLYHV 7KLV UHYHDOV WKDW the rational 
economic actor explanation of seeking a lower price is the only motive of purchasers in just 
30 per cent of cases where goods and services were bought in the informal economy, one of 
several rationales in 31 per cent of cases and not cited as a rationale in the remaining 39 per 
cent of cases. Rationales other than a lower price, in consequence, exist in 70 per cent of 
purchases in the informal economy.  
  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In 13 per cent of all cases where purchases were made in the informal economy, social 
rationales are the sole reason and in a further 23 per cent of cases, social rationales are 
combined with other reasons. A further 11 per cent of purchases in the informal economy, 
moreover, are purely due to the failings of the formal economy and in a further 23 per cent of 
all cases, the failings of the formal economy was cited alongside other rationales.  
 In the EU-28, in consequence, purchasers¶ XVH RI WKH LQIRUPDO HFRQRP\ WR DFTXLUH
goods and services cannot be explained by using just one or other of these explanations. 
Instead, all rationales have to be used to fully explain purchasers¶ XVH RI WKH LQIRUPDO
economy. As Table 1 displays, nevertheless, the weight that needs to be given to each of 
these explanations varies across EU regions. To see this, member states are grouped into four 
EU regions: Western Europe (Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Austria and the UK); Eastern and Central Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia); Southern Europe 
(Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta and Portugal), and the Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland; Sweden). As Table 1 reveals, there are marked var ations across EU regions in 
purchaser motives. The rationale of doing so purely to achieve a lower price is more common 
in Southern Europe (37 per cent) but less common in Western Europe (26 per cent). Social 
and/or redistributive rationales alone, meanwhile, are more commonly stated in Western 
Europe (17 per cent) while the imperfections of the formal economy are perhaps 
unsurprisingly more commonly stated as the sole reason in Eastern-Central Europe (15 per 
cent) but also surprisingly the Nordic nations (16 per cent), which might well be explained by 
the constraints resulting from labour shortages in the provision of many services.  
 Explanations for purchasing in the informal economy do not only differ across EU 
regions. They also vary across population groups. To see this, Table 2 investigates the 
variation in the likelihood of citing the various motives for purchasing goods and services in 
the informal economy. Despite the difficulties already mentioned of conducting a 
multivariate analysis, given the small sample size for some of the categories of the dependent 
variable, the results display the existence of relevant individual-level differences regarding 
purchasers¶PRWLYHV. Europeans who are more likely to cite the motive of a lower price, and 
thus those purchasers more susceptible to alterations in the FRVWEHQH¿W UDWLR WKDW WKH\IDFH
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are men, younger people and with a lower tax morality. Compared with unemployed people, 
moreover, the employed such as managers, the self-employed and other white collars are also 
more likely to cite the motive of a lower price. So too are those living in the Nordic nations. 
Europeans VWDWLVWLFDOO\OHVVVXVFHSWLEOHWRFKDQJHVLQWKHFRVWEHQH¿WUDWLRDUHVLQJOHSHRSOH
and those who never or almost never face difficulties paying bills.  
 Analysing the social actor explanation, Table 2 reveals that those purchasing 
informally to help someone (i.e. social and/or redistributive reasons) are significantly more 
likely to hold low tax morality, to be single and self-employed or a manager. Compared with 
those living in East-Central Europe, those living in Nordic nations are more likely to make 
purchases in the informal economy for such social/redistributive reasons. Those citing both 
lower price and social and/or redistributive motive are their reasons for purchasing from the 
informal economy, moreover, are more likely to be men, the self-employed and to have a 
lower tax morality.  
 Turning to the formal economy failure explanation, this perspective is again more 
applicable to some populations than others.  The rationale of formal economy failings alone is 
more likely to be cited by men, those with lower tax morality and the self-employed, 
managers and other white collars. Those citing both lower price and the failings of formal 
provision rationale, moreover, are again more likely to be men, with lower tax morale, self-
employed, managers, other white collars or manual workers, and compared with those living 
in East-Central Europe, those living in Western Europe are less likely to purchase from the 
informal economy for a combination of lower price and poor formal provision rationales. 
Those citing a mixture of social and/or redistributive reasons and poor formal provision 
rationales, furthermore, are younger, with a lower tax morality, self-employed, retired and 
managers, although those living in Nordic nations are significantly less inclined to purchase 
informally for this mixture of rationales.  
 Those citing all three motives together, namely the lower price, the social and/or 
redistributive reasons and the poor formal provision, are again men, with a lower tax 
morality, self-employed, manual workers, managers and other white collars. Europeans 
statistically less susceptible to cite all three motives simultaneously are those who never or 
almost never face difficulties paying bills. Those citing another motive than those analysed or 
which declared they do not know or refused to mention the reason are more likely to be those 
with lower tax morale, managers and to leave in Southern Europe or Nordic nations. 
 Importantly, moreover, and as shown in Table 2, tax morale appears to be 
significantly associated with purchasers¶ PRWLYHV IRU acquiring goods and services in the 
informal economy. Here, in consequence, we examine this by analysing the predicted 
likelihood of purchasing in the informal economy for various reasons according to their level 
of tax morale. As Figure 1 displays, across all motives for purchasing from the informal 
economy, the representative EU consumer with lower tax morale (i.e., 1 represents higher tax 
morale and 10 lower tax morale), is more likely to cite each and every reason. The only 
instance in which this does not occur is when purchasers cite some other motive and/or refuse 
to answer. In this case, the probability of citing this as their reason decreases when tax morale 
has a value of 8. Nevertheless, the probability of citing another motive, refusing to mention a 
motive or to answer remains higher than for those with lower tax morality. 
    
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper, purchasers¶ PRWLYHV IRU participating in the informal economy have been 
evaluated using a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of the EU-28. The descriptive statistics reveal 
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that saving money is the sole rationale in only 30 per cent of transactions, one of several 
rationales in a further 31 per cent of exchanges and absent in 39 per cent of transactions. 
Therefore, in 70 per cent of transactions, other rationales exist besides a lower cost. 
Purchasers also participate in the informal economy for social and redistributive reasons, as 
well as because of the failures of the formal economy in terms of the availability, speed and 
quality of goods and services provision. 
 However, different types of European citizen are significantly more likely to explain 
their participation in particular ways. Those more susceptible to changes LQ WKHFRVWEHQH¿W
ratio are men, younger people, the employed, with a lower tax morality, and living in Nordic 
nations. Those less susceptible to alterations in WKHFRVWEHQH¿W UDWLRDUH VLQJOHSHRSOH DQG 
those who never or almost never face difficulties paying bills. Those more likely to cite social 
or redistributive rationales are single, self-employed or a manager, have low tax morality, and 
live in Nordic nations. Those citing the failings of the formal economy are more likely to be 
men, with lower tax morality and the self-employed, managers and other white collars.  
 These findings from a purchaser perspective, rather than the predominant supplier 
perspective, have theoretical implications. Evaluating the rational economic actor, social 
actor and formal economy failure explanations, they reveal that no one explanation for 
making purchases in the informal economy suffices. Instead, if purchasers¶PRWLYHVDUHWREH
fully explained, all these theoretical explanations need to be employed. All three explanations 
are relevant, albeit with some groups being significantly more likely to make purchases in the 
informal economy for different reasons. Whether similar patterns prevail elsewhere beyond 
the European Union regarding the groups significantly more likely to purchase informally for 
particular reasons now needs to be evaluated. What is certain, however, is that studies can no 
longer simply treat participants in the informal economy as always being either rational 
economic actors, social actors or doing so solely due to the failings of the formal economy.   
 This has important implications for policy. To tackle the informal economy, the 
conventional approach, based on the rational economic actor model, has been to change the 
cost/benefit ratio confronting participants by focusing upon the cost side and increasing the 
penalties and likelihood of detection (e.g., Hasseldine and Li, 1999, Grabiner, 2000, 
Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). The outcome has been a focus upon deterrence policy 
measures. Recently, nevertheless, such deterrence measures have begun to be complemented 
by additional measures seeking to improve the benefits of, or provide incentives for, 
operating formally, including amnesties and tax subsidies for those purchasing formal goods 
and services, such as service vouchers (European Commission, 2007; Small Business 
Council, 2004; Williams, 2014). This paper, however, displays that this policy approach of 
changing the cost/benefit ratio facing purchasers will only be effective with a narrow range of 
purchasers (i.e., men, younger people, the employed, with a lower tax morality, and living in 
Nordic nations). Purchasers participating in the informal economy are not always rational 
economic actors, but are also pursuing social ends as well as avoiding the failings of the 
formal economy, namely the availability, speed, reliability and quality of formal provision.  
 To more fully tackle purchasing in the informal economy, therefore, not only will the 
imperfections in the formal economy need to be tackled but how to tackle those making 
purchases for social ends will also need to be given consideration. On the one hand, and to 
tackle formal economy imperfections, the lack of availability and speed of formal sector 
provision could be addressed using local phone hotlines, web portals and one-stop shops for 
customers to access formal sector suppliers, whilst tackling the reliability and quality of the 
formal economy can be addressed using quality assurance systems, such as kite-marks. This 
paper displays how these measures are required not only in East-Central Europe but also need 
to be targeted at the employed, men and those with a lower tax morality. On the other hand, 
tackling exchanges conducted for social ends, which is concentrated among single people, the 
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self-employed, managers, those with a low tax morality, and Nordic nations, requires 
consideration of whether to adopt a laissez-faire approach, whether tax regulations need to 
change (e.g., introducing a system whereby suppliers can earn up to maximum annual amount 
tax free or a system of vouchers to subsidise purchasers declaring such transactions), or 
whether new institutions are required so that people can undertake these paid favours 
legitimately, such as Local Exchange and Trading Schemes (LETS) or time banks (Aldridge 
et al., 2001). Such options will require further evaluation.  
 If this paper therefore results in a shift beyond simplistic one-dimensional 
theorisati ns of purchaser motives and towards a more nuanced theorisation that is 
appreciative of the multifarious logics and drivers in different populations, then it will have 
met one of its major intentions. If this consequently leads to recognition of the diverse policy 
measures required to tackle purchasing in the informal economy, then the fuller intention of 
this paper will have been achieved. What is certain, however, is that research on the informal 
economy can no longer focus upon solely the supply-side and ignore explaining and tackling 
the demand-side of the informal economy.   
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Table 1 Purchasers¶PRWLYHVIRU participating in the informal economy: by EU region 
 
Lo
w
er
 
pr
ic
e 
al
on
e 
So
ci
al
 a
n
d/
or
 
re
di
str
ib
u
tiv
e 
re
as
o
n
s 
al
on
e 
 
Po
o
r 
fo
rm
al
 p
ro
v
isi
on
 
al
on
e 
M
ix
tu
re
 o
f l
o
w
er
 
pr
ic
e 
&
 
so
ci
al
 a
n
d/
or
 
re
di
str
ib
u
tiv
e 
re
as
o
n
s 
M
ix
tu
re
 o
f l
o
w
er
 
pr
ic
e 
an
d 
&
 
po
o
r 
fo
rm
al
 
pr
o
v
isi
on
 
 
M
ix
tu
re
 o
f s
o
ci
al
 a
n
d/
or
 
re
di
str
ib
u
tiv
e 
re
as
o
n
s 
&
 
po
o
r 
fo
rm
al
 p
ro
v
isi
on
 
 
M
ix
tu
re
 o
f l
o
w
er
 
pr
ic
e,
 
so
ci
al
 a
n
d/
or
 
re
di
str
ib
u
tiv
e 
re
as
o
n
s 
&
 
po
o
r 
fo
rm
al
 p
ro
v
isi
on
 
 
O
th
er
 
m
o
tiv
e/
 R
ef
u
sa
l/ 
D
K
 
EU 28 30 13 11 12 12 4 7 11 
Western Europe 26 17 12 13 10 5 8 9 
East-Central Europe 27 8 15 10 18 5 8 9 
Southern Europe 37 11 7 12 10 3 5 15 
Nordic nations 29 12 16 7 14 2 5 15 
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Table 2. Multinomial logit regression of purchasers¶motives for participating in the informal economy, EU-28 (Reference category: not having 
purchased good or services over the last 12 months) 
Variables 
Lower price 
alone 
Social and/or 
redistributive 
reasons alone 
Poor formal 
provision alone 
Mixture of 
lower price & 
social and/or 
redistributive 
reasons 
Mixture of 
lower price 
and & poor 
formal 
provision 
Mixture of 
social and/or 
redistributive 
reasons & poor 
formal 
provision 
Mixture of lower 
price, social 
and/or 
redistributive 
reasons & poor 
formal provision 
Other 
motive/ 
Refusal/ DK 
Tax morality 0.293*** 0.228*** 0.162*** 0.357*** 0.277*** 0.206*** 0.314*** 0.0730* 
 (0.026) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) 
Gender (CG: Female)         
Male 0.454*** 0.001 0.184** 0.320*** 0.157** -0.073 0.420*** -0.023 
 (0.073) (0.155) (0.089) (0.123) (0.074) (0.153) (0.116) (0.101) 
Age (exact age) -0.010* 0.006 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.010** -0.010* -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Marital status (CG: (Re-) Married/ Living with partner)       
Single -0.340** 0.268* -0.295 0.025 -0.168 -0.154 -0.056 0.163 
 (0.153) (0.163) (0.193) (0.204) (0.213) (0.143) (0.239) (0.169) 
Divorced or separated -0.076 -0.084 -0.008 -0.268 -0.130 0.174 0.137 0.214 
 (0.140) (0.197) (0.150) (0.287) (0.165) (0.216) (0.268) (0.163) 
Widow/ other -0.252 -0.283 -0.211 -0.083 -0.150 -0.112 0.046 0.016 
 (0.193) (0.211) (0.161) (0.284) (0.195) (0.256) (0.270) (0.213) 
Occupation (CG: Unemployed)         
Self-employed 0.547** 0.903*** 0.698*** 0.841*** 1.079*** 1.525*** 1.006*** 0.350 
 (0.215) (0.203) (0.245) (0.280) (0.213) (0.445) (0.225) (0.238) 
Managers 0.624*** 0.614*** 1.254*** 0.300 0.761*** 1.666*** 1.119*** 0.681*** 
 (0.143) (0.215) (0.198) (0.262) (0.237) (0.426) (0.269) (0.251) 
Other white collars 0.495*** 0.066 0.465* 0.306 0.599*** 0.728 0.788*** 0.062 
 (0.142) (0.241) (0.260) (0.237) (0.190) (0.551) (0.282) (0.203) 
Manual workers 0.104 0.130 0.142 0.235 0.365** 0.591 0.649*** -0.100 
 (0.157) (0.192) (0.226) (0.222) (0.172) (0.469) (0.229) (0.213) 
House persons 0.275 0.173 0.246 0.127 0.126 -1.039 0.434 0.014 
 (0.171) (0.318) (0.271) (0.328) (0.207) (0.738) (0.402) (0.243) 
Retired -0.025 -0.039 0.240 0.094 0.242 0.984** 0.356 0.239 
 (0.224) (0.247) (0.236) (0.307) (0.238) (0.425) (0.269) (0.293) 
Students 0.262* -0.078 0.425 0.130 0.098 0.406 0.364 0.046 
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 (0.156) (0.238) (0.263) (0.328) (0.331) (0.549) (0.329) (0.226) 
Difficulties paying bills (CG: Most of the time)        
From time to time -0.240** 0.021 0.042 0.092 -0.084 -0.011 -0.173 0.074 
 (0.103) (0.197) (0.150) (0.185) (0.134) (0.295) (0.166) (0.199) 
Almost never/ never -0.413** 0.205 0.029 -0.093 -0.150 0.014 -0.549** 0.259 
 (0.172) (0.162) (0.216) (0.192) (0.147) (0.265) (0.239) (0.262) 
People 15+ years in own household (CG: One)        
Two 0.011 0.256* 0.069 0.049 0.113 -0.214 0.065 -0.019 
 (0.107) (0.141) (0.159) (0.173) (0.159) (0.159) (0.193) (0.162) 
Three -0.108 0.167 -0.058 0.008 0.206 -0.153 0.018 0.095 
 (0.125) (0.169) (0.235) (0.228) (0.270) (0.226) (0.210) (0.187) 
Four and more -0.149 -0.040 -0.097 -0.166 0.118 -0.196 0.262 -0.109 
 (0.099) (0.207) (0.258) (0.263) (0.219) (0.268) (0.221) (0.257) 
Children (CG: No children)           
Having children -0.001 0.024 0.039 0.139 0.180 0.332* 0.155 0.029 
 (0.064) (0.112) (0.106) (0.139) (0.131) (0.175) (0.127) (0.093) 
Area (CG: Rural area or village)         
Small or middle sized town 0.013 -0.140 0.112 -0.028 -0.062 -0.394* 0.070 0.112 
 (0.112) (0.118) (0.095) (0.143) (0.122) (0.211) (0.160) (0.146) 
Large town 0.139 -0.149 0.170 -0.058 0.063 -0.243 0.012 0.141 
 (0.158) (0.139) (0.123) (0.174) (0.114) (0.182) (0.202) (0.172) 
Region (CG: East-Central Europe)        
Western Europe -0.110 0.449 -0.533 0.209 -0.574** -0.244 -0.109 -0.145 
 (0.326) (0.282) (0.358) (0.289) (0.286) (0.275) (0.411) (0.259) 
Southern Europe 0.539 0.210 -0.252 0.198 -0.307 -0.435 -0.309 0.971*** 
 (0.372) (0.242) (0.423) (0.377) (0.422) (0.385) (0.342) (0.303) 
Nordic nations 0.612* 0.626* -0.135 0.263 0.107 -0.781*** -0.140 0.600*** 
 (0.332) (0.344) (0.224) (0.490) (0.353) (0.262) (0.340) (0.170) 
Constant -3.558*** -5.508*** -4.669*** -5.214*** -4.307*** -5.160*** -5.100*** -4.627*** 
 (0.367) (0.255) (0.608) (0.543) (0.521) (0.500) (0.577) (0.586) 
Observations 24,356 
Pseudo R2 0.044 
Notes: 
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country). 
All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
We kept in the analysis only respondents for whom data on each and every independent variable is available. 
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Figure 1. 3UHGLFWHGSUREDELOLW\RIUHDVRQVIRUDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYHFLWL]HQ¶SXUFKDVLQJJRRGVDQG
services in the informal economy in Europe: by level of tax morality (with 95% CI). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variables used in the analysis: definitions and descriptive statistics (N = 24,356) 
Variables Definition Mode or mean Min/ Max 
Dependent variable    
Motives for purchasing 
goods and services in the 
informal ec nomy 
Respondent motives for purchasing goods and 
services in the informal economy in the last 12 
months in categories (respondents reporting not 
purchasing goods and services in the informal 
economy were considered as a reference 
category). 
Not purchase undeclared 
goods and services 
(88%) 
1 / 9 
Independent variables    
Tax morality Constructed index of self-reported tolerance 
towards tax non-compliance 
2.3 1 / 10 
Gender Dummy for the gender of the respondent Female (52%) 0 / 1 
Age  Respondent exact age 47 years 15 / 98 
Marital status Respondent marital status in categories (Re-)Married/ Living 
with partner (64%) 
1 / 4 
Occupation Respondent occupation in categories Retired (25%) 1 / 8 
Difficulties paying bills Respondent difficulties in paying bills in 
categories 
Almost never/ never 
(60%) 
1 / 3 
People 15+ years in own 
household 
People 15+ years in respondent`s household 
(including the respondent) in categories 
Two (48%) 1 / 4 
Children Dummy for the presence of children (up to 14 
years old) in the household 
No children (71%) 0 / 1 
Area Size of the area where the respondent lives in 
categories 
Small or middle sized 
town (41%) 
1 / 3 
Region Region where the respondent lives in categories Western Europe (49%) 1 / 4 
 
 
 
Page 18 of 18International Journal of Social Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
